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Abstract
We consider a general class of nonlinear optimal policy problems involv-
ing forward-looking constraints (such as the Euler equations that are typically
present as structural equations in DSGE models), and show that it is possible,
under regularity conditions that are straightforward to check, to derive a prob-
lem with linear constraints and a quadratic objective that approximates the ex-
act problem. The LQ approximate problem is computationally simple to solve,
even in the case of moderately large state spaces and flexibly parameterized
disturbance processes, and its solution represents a local linear approximation
to the optimal policy for the exact model in the case that stochastic distur-
bances are small enough. We derive the second-order conditions that must be
satisfied in order for the LQ problem to have a solution, and show that these
are stronger, in general, than those required for LQ problems without forward-
looking constraints. We also show how the same linear approximations to the
model structural equations and quadratic approximation to the exact welfare
measure can be used to correctly rank alternative simple policy rules, again in
the case of small enough shocks.
∗An earlier version of this paper was presented as a Plenary Lecture at the 10th Annual Con-
ference on Computing in Economics and Finance, Amsterdam, July 2004. We would like to thank
Filippo Altissimo, Vasco Curdia, Ken Judd, Jinill Kim, Andy Levin, and Diego Rodriguez Palen-
zuela for comments, and the National Science Foundation for research support through a grant to
the NBER.
Linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal-control problems have been the subject of an ex-
tensive literature.1 General characterizations of their solutions and useful numerical
algorithms to compute them are now available, allowing models with fairly large state
spaces, complicated dynamic linkages, and a range of alternative informational as-
sumptions to be handled.2 And the extension of the classic results of the engineering
control literature to the case of forward-looking systems of the kind that naturally
arise in economic policy problems when one allows for rational expectations on the
part of the private sector has proven to be fairly straightforward.3
An important question, however, is whether optimal policy problems of economic
interest should take this convenient form. It is easy enough to apply LQ methodology
if one specifies an ad hoc quadratic loss function on the basis of informal consider-
ation of the kinds of instability in the economy that one would like to reduce, and
posits linear structural relations that capture certain features of economic time series
without requiring these relations to have explicit choice-theoretic foundations, as in
early applications to problems of monetary policy.4 But it is highly unlikely that the
analysis of optimal policy in a DSGE model will involve either an exactly quadratic
utility function or exactly linear constraints.
We shall nonetheless argue that LQ problems can usefully be employed as ap-
proximations to exact optimal policy problems in a fairly broad range of cases. Since
an LQ problem necessarily leads to an optimal decision rule that is linear, the most
that one could hope to obtain with any generality would be for the solution to the
LQ problem to represent a local linear approximation to the actual optimal policy
— that is, a first-order Taylor approximation to the true, nonlinear optimal policy
rule. In this paper we present conditions under which this will be the case, and show
how to derive an LQ approximate problem corresponding to any member of a general
class of optimal policy problems.
The conditions under which the solution to an LQ approximate problem will yield
a correct local linear approximation to optimal policy are in fact more restrictive
than might be expected, and than some of the literature on numerical methods for
1Important references include Bertsekas (1976), Chow (1975), Hansen and Sargent (2004),
Kendrick (1981), Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972), and Sargent (1987). See Kendrick (2005) for an
overview of the use of LQ methods in economics.
2For numerical algorithms see, among others, Amman and Kendrick (1999), Gerali and Lippi
(2005), Hansen and Sargent (2004), and So¨derlind (1999).
3See, e.g., Backus and Driffill (1986) for a useful review.
4Notable examples include Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1975) and Leroy and Waud (1977).
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the analysis of DSGE models has suggested.5 In particular, it does not suffice that
the objective and constraints of the exact problem be continuously differentiable a
sufficient number of times, that the solution to the LQ approximate problem imply a
stationary evolution of the endogenous variables, and that the exogenous disturbances
be small enough (though each of these conditions is obviously necessary, except in
highly special cases). An approach that simply computes a second-order Taylor-series
approximation to the utility function and a first-order Taylor-series approximation
to the model structural relations in order to define an approximate LQ problem —
what we shall call “naive LQ approximation” — may yield a linear policy rule with
coefficients very different from those of a correct linear approximation to the optimal
policy in the case of small enough disturbances, as the example of optimal dynamic
tax policy considered in Benigno and Woodford (2006) shows.6
Nonetheless, it is quite generally possible to construct an alternative quadratic
objective function — one that also represents a correct local second-order approx-
imation to expected utility under any feasible policy, but that does not imply the
same linear characterization of optimal policy when used as the objective for an LQ
problem — which will result in a correct local LQ approximation. The approach that
we use is essentially the one introduced by Fleming (1971), and used by Magill (1977)
to derive a local LQ approximation to a continuous-time multi-sector optimal growth
model. Here we extend the work of Fleming and Magill by showing how a similar
method can be used in the context of discrete-time dynamic optimization problems of
the kind that typically arise in the literatures on optimal monetary and fiscal policy,
and showing how the method can be extended to the case where some of the struc-
tural relations are forward-looking, as is almost inevitably the case in optimal policy
problems.7
In section 1, we first explain the problem with naive LQ approximation in the
context of a simple static optimization problem, and introduce the general idea of
our alternative approach. We offer additional comparisons there of the approach that
we propose to other possible approaches to the local characterization of optimal pol-
5This is stressed by Judd (1999, pp. 507-508), who recommends the use of alternative perturba-
tion techniques for the local characterization of optimal policy.
6The same problem can also result in incorrect welfare rankings of alternative simple policies, as
discussed by Kim and Kim (2003, 2006).
7See also Levine et al. (2006) for another discussion of how our method compares to that of
Fleming and Magill.
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icy. In section 2, we then show how the method can be applied to a general class of
dynamic optimization problems with forward-looking constraints. Section 3 discusses
the general algebraic form of the first- and second-order conditions for optimality in
the LQ approximate problem. Section 4 shows how the quadratic objective for stabi-
lization policy derived in section 2 can also be used to compute welfare comparisons
between alternative sub-optimal policies, in the case that the stochastic disturbances
are small enough. Finally, section 5 discusses applications of the general method
described here and concludes.
1 Pitfalls of Naive LQ Approximation
Here we explain why naive LQ approximation is generally inadequate, in the context
of a simple static optimization problem that allows us to the explain the issues in
terms of simple multivariate calculus. We then compare a variety of possible responses
to the problem, including the one that we favor.
1.1 Static Analysis
Suppose that we wish to find the policy y(ξ) that maximizes an objective U(y; ξ),
where y is an n-vector of endogenous variables and ξ is a vector of exogenous distur-
bances; we assume that U is at least twice continuously differentiable with respect
to the arguments y. Suppose furthermore that the possible outcomes y that can be
achieved by policy in any state of the world ξ are those values consistent with the
structural equations
F (y; ξ) = 0, (1.1)
where F is a vector of m functions (for some m < n), again each at least twice
continuously differentiable. We assume that m < n so that there is at least one
direction in which it is possible for the outcome y to be varied by policy. We might
suppose that y is determined by equations (1.1) together with an additional set of
n−m equations of the form
G(y; i, ξ) = 0, (1.2)
where i is a vector of n−m instrument settings (or control variables); but the nature
of the additional equations (1.2) does not matter for our conclusions below, as long
3





are of full rank when the partial derivatives are evaluated at the point around which
we conduct our local analysis.
Now let y¯ be the outcome under an optimal policy in the case that ξ = 0; that is,
it maximizes U(y; 0) subject to the constraints F (y; 0) = 0.8 A second-order Taylor
series expansion of U , computed at values (y¯; 0) of the arguments, is then given by
U(y; ξ) = U¯ +DyU · y˜ +DξU · ξ +
1
2
y˜′D2yyU · y˜ +
1
2
ξ′D2ξξU · ξ + y˜′D2yξU · ξ +O(||ξ||3)
= DyU · y˜ + 1
2
y˜′D2yyU · y˜ + y˜′D2yξU · ξ + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (1.3)
where we introduce the notation y˜ ≡ y − y¯, U¯ ≡ U(y¯; 0), and the several matrices of
partial derivatives are each evaluated at (y¯; 0). The expression “t.i.p.” refers to terms
that are independent of the policy chosen (such as the constant term and terms that
depend only on the exogenous disturbances); the form of these terms is irrelevant
in obtaining a correct ranking of alternative policies. Finally, ||ξ|| is a bound on
the vector of disturbances ξ. In stating that the residual is of order O(||ξ||3) in the
amplitude of the disturbances, we assume that y − y¯ = O(||ξ||). This condition will
hold, in the case of any policy that makes y(ξ) continuously differentiable,9 as long
as y(0) = y¯. We shall restrict our analysis to policies that satisfy the latter property,
i.e., that bring about y¯ in the case that there are no disturbances.10
A naive LQ approximation of this problem can then be obtained by replacing the
exact objective U(y; ξ) by the quadratic objective
UQ(y; ξ) ≡ DyU · y˜ + 1
2
y˜′D2yyU · y˜ + y˜′D2yξU · ξ, (1.4)
8Note that we must compute our local approximations to the objective and constraints around
this optimal point if there is to be any hope that consideration of these local approximations alone
can correctly identify the optimal policy rule even in the case that ξ is small.
9In the case that y(ξ) is determined by a vector of instrument settings through structural re-
lations of the form (1.2), y(ξ) will be continuously differentiable near ξ = 0 as long as the rank
conditions stated in the previous paragraph are satisfied, and the policy rule i(ξ) is itself continu-
ously differentiable.
10Note that by assumption, the optimal policy rule belongs to this class of rules.
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and replacing the exact constraints (1.1) by their linearized form,
DyF · y˜ +DξF · ξ = 0. (1.5)
The question that we wish to consider is whether the solution to this problem —
that is, the policy yLQ(ξ) that maximizes UQ(y; ξ) subject to the constraints (1.5)
— represents at least a correct local linear approximation to the true optimal policy
yopt(ξ). That is, we wish to determine whether
yopt(ξ) = yLQ(ξ) +O(||ξ||2) (1.6)
in the case of small enough disturbances.
In fact, the regularity conditions stated thus far do not suffice to guarantee this.
The policy that maximizes the naive quadratic objective (1.4) subject to the linearized




′DyF = 0, (1.7)
where λ (a function of ξ) is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints. The naive LQ-optimal policy yLQ(ξ) is then obtained by solving the
system of equations consisting of (1.5) and (1.7) for y and λ as linear functions of ξ.
The solution yopt(xi) to the exact policy problem instead satisfies the nonlinear
first-order conditions11
DyU(y; ξ) + λ
′DyF (y; ξ) = 0 (1.8)
along with (1.1). A correct local approximation to the solution to these equations can
be obtained (using the implicit function theorem) by linearizing equations (1.1) and
(1.8) around the unperturbed solution y(0) = y¯. The linearization of equations (1.1)





′DyF + λ¯I [y˜′D2yyF
I + ξ′D2ξyF
I ] = 0, (1.9)
where λ¯ ≡ λ(0) is the vector of multipliers when there are no shocks. Here we use
tensor notation as in Judd (1999, chap. 14), omitting the summation sign ΣI ; the
11Here we assume that the solution to the first-order conditions is indeed the optimum, though
this need not be true if the constraint set is non-convex.
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index I ranges over the m constraints. Hence the correct linear approximation to
yopt(ξ) is obtained by solving the system of equations consisting of (1.5) and (1.9) for
y and λ as linear functions of ξ. Because the two final terms on the left-hand side of
(1.9) are missing in (1.7), the naive method will generally yield incorrect coefficients
for the linear policy rule.
The problem is that a linear approximation of the structural equations (1.5) suf-
fices to indicate the possible ways in which it is possible for y to vary in response to
ξ, to first order in the amplitude of the disturbances ξ, but this is not generally a
sufficiently accurate characterization of outcomes under a given policy to allow an ap-
proximate evaluation of the objective U that is accurate to second order. In general,
second-order contributions to the solution for y(ξ) under a given policy rule make
second-order contributions to the level of U associated with that rule; and even when
||ξ|| is arbitrarily small, these second-order contributions to U need not be negligible
relative to the other second-order contributions that are taken account of when one
evaluates UQ using a local linear approximation to y(ξ).12
In fact, in the case of any given outcome y(ξ) associated with a (sufficiently
differentiable) policy, a second-order Taylor series expansion of U(y(ξ); ξ) can be
written in the form
U(y(ξ); ξ) = UQ(yL(ξ); ξ) +DjU [ξ
′D2ξξy
j · ξ] + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (1.10)
where UQ is again the naive quadratic objective defined in (1.4),
yL(ξ) ≡ y¯ +Dξy · ξ
is a local linear approximation to y(ξ), and in the second term on the right-hand
side, we again use tensor notation. Here we have simplified using the fact that the
derivatives Dξy must satisfy
DyF ·Dξy +DξF = 0,
in order for yL to represent a solution to the linearized structural relations (1.5).
Estimation of the level of welfare associated with the given policy using UQ(yL)
omits the second-order contributions from the second term on the right-hand side of
(1.10). These are second-order contributions to U resulting from second-order terms
12See Woodford (2002; 2003, sec. 6.1) and Sutherland (2002) for further discussion.
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in the Taylor expansion of y(ξ), that exist to the extent that the gradient vector DyU
has non-zero elements. When these additional terms are non-zero, alternative policies
cannot be correctly ranked, even to second order in the amplitude of the disturbances,
simply on the basis of a local linear characterization of equilibrium outcomes under
those policies.
1.2 Responses to the Problem
Several approaches have been taken in the literature to computing a correct local
linear approximation to optimal policy, that (at least under certain circumstances)
avoid the problem just expounded with a naive LQ approximation. We briefly discuss
some of these before presenting our own proposed solution.
(1) The naive LQ approach yields a correct local characterization of optimal policy
in the case that the constraints (1.1) are exactly linear). If they are, the use of the
linearized equations (1.5) involves no error, and the problem discussed above does




for each I, so that equations (1.9) are equivalent to (1.7). Thus the problem with
naive LQ approximation is not that the objective functions in optimal policy problems
are not exactly quadratic, but rather that the constraints are almost never exactly
linear.
Even in the case of a policy problem with nonlinear constraints, it may be pos-
sible to obtain a problem with purely linear constraints through a suitable change
of variables. This is the approach used in Kydland and Prescott (1982) to obtain
a valid LQ approximation. The (nonlinear) production function is substituted into
the utility function to express utility as a function of the paths of hours, capital,
and investment spending; the only remaining constraint is the exactly linear rela-
tion between investment spending and the dynamics of the capital stock. After this
transformation of their planning problem, a second-order Taylor series expansion of
the derived objective function yields an LQ planning problem, the solution to which
is a correct linear approximation to the solution to the original planning problem.
However, the circumstances under which a transformation of this kind can be found
are fairly special.13
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(2) The naive LQ approach also yields a correct local characterization of optimal
policy in the case that one expands around a point y¯ at which the gradient vector
DyU(y¯; 0) = 0. In this case the second term on the right-hand side of (1.10) is equal
to zero under any policy, and UQ(yL) correctly ranks alternative policies, to second
order. Similarly, since in this case the constraints (1.1) do not bind in the absence
of shocks, λ¯ = 0, and again conditions (1.9) reduce to (1.7). This is why an LQ
approximation can be used to characterize optimal policy in the model of Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997).14
In some cases, an appropriate change of variables may result in this condition
holding. In the case of Rotemberg and Woodford, the gradient vector would be non-
zero if one were to expand in terms of consumption and hours, the “direct” arguments
of the utility function. But they use the (nonlinear) production function to solve for
hours of each variety as a function of sectoral output, and the market-clearing relation
to solve for consumption of each differentiated good as a function of output, obtaining
an expression for utility as a function of the quantities produced of the various goods;
and the gradient with respect to each of these quantities is zero, in the case that they
consider. But even with the change of variables, the method is applicable only if the
flexible-price equilibrium allocation of resources is efficient, which need not be the
case, owing for example to market power or tax distortions (Benigno and Woodford,
2005a). This last observation is itself an important practical limitation, and in more
complex examples it may not be easy to find a suitable change of variables.
(3) A correct local linear approximation to optimal policy can often be obtained
by deriving the exact first-order conditions for (Ramsey) optimal policy using exact
specifications of the objective and constraints, and then log-linearizing the non-linear
stochastic difference equations obtained in this way, as illustrated in the derivation of
equations (1.9) above. This method has been used extensively in the recent literature
on optimal monetary and fiscal policy by authors such as King and Wolman (1999),
Khan et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b). The method will generally
yield a correct result as long as the optimal equilibrium, in the case of small enough
13Kydland and Prescott’s “time-to-build” approach to modelling capital adjustment costs is nec-
essary in order for the constraint to be exactly linear in their case, and hence important for the
validity of the numerical method that they use to characterize equilibrium dynamics, though they
do not comment on this. Standard convex adjustment costs, for example, would result in a nonlinear
constraint.
14The conditions for the validity of this approach are further discussed in Woodford (2002).
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exogenous shocks, remains forever near a deterministic steady state, around which
first-order conditions are log-linearized.15 It is also straightforward to obtain higher-
order local characterizations of optimal policy, through a higher-order perturbation
expansion of the first-order conditions.
A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that while it allows a solution for
optimal policy, it does not provide a convenient way of ranking sub-optimal policies.
An LQ approximation, if valid (as in either of the two cases just described), also
provides a simple way of evaluating arbitrary policies, as long as they are not too far
from optimal: one obtains an approximate characterization of the outcome under the
policy by solving the linearized model equations (constraints), and then evaluates the
quadratic loss function under the resulting linear dynamics. (The method should cor-
rectly rank policies, in the case of small enough shocks, as long as they are consistent
with the steady state around which the local approximations are computed – or more
generally, as long as they are close enough to consistency with it.) This is important,
insofar as in models of a complexity that would allow them to be used in quantitative
policy analysis, the fully optimal (Ramsey) policy is almost certainly too complex to
represent a practical policy proposal, and the welfare losses associated with a simpler
policy may be quite small. The comparative evaluation of simple policy rules, within
families of rules too restrictive to include the optimal policy, is accordingly a prime
goal of quantitative analyses of stabilization policy.
Another disadvantage is that solution of a local linear approximation to the first-
order conditions does not guarantee that the solution is even locally an (approximate)
optimum, as second-order conditions for the optimal policy problem may fail, as
discussed further below in section 3, and in the context of a specific example in
Benigno and Woodford (2005a). In the case of a valid LQ approximation, this issue
is automatically settled (i.e., a local optimum is guaranteed) if the quadratic loss
function is convex, which requires only that one check an algebraic property of the
weighting matrix.16
15In general, the equilibrium resulting from the optimal Ramsey policy is time-invariant, even in
the absence of stochastic disturbances, only if one adds certain constraints on initial outcomes to
the standard, “unconstrained” Ramsey problem. These are discussed further in section 2.1 below.
This issue must be confronted by any local approximation method that characterizes optimal policy
using linear equations with constant coefficients.
16Of course, one could check the second-order conditions for an optimum as part of the pertur-
bation analysis of the exact Ramsey problem; but this seems seldom to be done in the literature
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(4) Alternatively, the problem noted above would be eliminated if we evaluate
(1.3) using a second-order approximation to the equilibrium evolution y(ξ) under any
given policy rule, rather than a mere linear (or log-linear approximation). A second-
order approximation to y(ξ) can be computed by applying perturbation techniques
to the system of equations consisting of (1.1) and (1.2), where the latter equation(s)
specify the policy that is to be evaluated. Methods for executing computations of
this kind in the case of general classes of forward-looking equation systems are now
widely available,17 and have been used in many recent numerical analyses of optimal
policy (e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004c).
This approach, however, has the disadvantage that it does not make it easy to find
even an approximate characterization of fully optimal policy, as one has to compute
a second-order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics implied by each candidate
policy rule individually. One can approximate the optimal rule within a particular
parametric family, by searching over a grid of parameter values, at each element of
which one evaluates welfare; in practice, in such studies attention is restricted to
low-dimensional families of simple rules. An LQ approach, when valid, instead allows
one to determine which form of rule is optimal. And while the fully optimal rule is
not likely to be of interest as a practical policy proposal, as noted above, computing
it is nonetheless valuable as a source of insight into which types of simple rules are
most likely to be nearly optimal.
Hence there would remain important advantages of an LQ approach, were a valid
approximation of this form possible outside the restrictive cases already mentioned.
Here we show how a valid LQ approximation can be derived, for a much more general
class of policy problems.
(5) In the approach that we recommend, a quadratic loss function is derived that
differs (in general) from UQ, but that nonetheless represents a valid second-order
approximation to U, in the case of the outcomes associated with any possible policy.
That is, we seek a quadratic function Uˆ(y; ξ) with the property that
U(y; ξ) = Uˆ(y; ξ) +O(||ξ||3) (1.11)
on Ramsey policy, and would in any event involve computing essentially the same matrices as are
required to derive our LQ approximation, as is discussed further below.
17See, e.g., Jin and Judd (2002), Kim et al. (2003), and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a). The
DYNARE project at CEPREMAP has been especially important in making these techniques widely
available to macroeconomic researchers.
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in the case of any values of the arguments satisfying (1.1) and such that y − y¯ =
O(||ξ||). The fact that we require (1.11) to hold only for values of y that can be
achieved by some policy, rather than for all values of y near enough to y¯, means
that Uˆ need not coincide with UQ, despite Taylor’s theorem. Among the variety of
possible quadratic approximations Uˆ with this property, we furthermore seek one that
is purely quadratic, i.e., with zero coefficients on the linear terms. Then DyUˆ = 0,
and (1.11) can be evaluated to second-order accuracy using only a first-order accurate
approximation to y(ξ) under the policy rule of interest. Hence the LQ problem of
maximizing the quadratic objective Uˆ(y; ξ) subject to the linear constraints (1.5)
represents a valid local approximation to the original policy problem, and the linear
policy that solves this LQ problem represents a correct local linear approximation of
the optimal policy yopt.
The key to finding an approximate objective with these properties is to use a
second-order Taylor series approximation to the constraints (1.1) to replace the linear
terms in (1.3) with purely quadratic terms;18 while the resulting function is not even
locally equivalent to UQ, it is equivalent in the case of all outcomes consistent with
equations (1.1) that are near enough to y¯. While this method (like the one just dis-
cussed) relies upon computing a second-order approximation to the model structural
relations, the second-order approximation need be used only once, in determining the
coefficients of the quadratic objective Uˆ , rather than having to be used again each
time one seeks to evaluate the welfare associated with yet another candidate policy.
We can illustrate the method in the case of the static problem considered above.
A second-order approximation to the structural relations (1.1), of the same form as
the approximation (1.3), implies that
DyF
I · y˜ = −1
2
y˜′D2yyF
I · y˜ − y˜′D2yξF I · ξ + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
in the case of any (y; ξ) satisfying (1.1). The fact that y¯ is an optimal policy when
the disturbances are zero implies that
DyU = −λ¯′DyF, (1.12)
18A similar method is used by Sutherland (2002) to compute correct second-order approximations
to welfare under alternative policies. However, his second-order approximation is computed for a
particular parametric class of policies, while we derive a quadratic loss function that yields a correct
welfare measure for any feasible policy.
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where λ¯ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (1.1) in
the case of zero disturbances.It then follows that






I · y˜ + λ¯I y˜′D2yξF I · ξ + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).








I ] · y˜ + y˜′[D2yξU + λ¯ID2yξF I ] · ξ + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
This is an approximation of the form (1.11), where





I ] · y˜ + y˜′[D2yξU + λ¯ID2yξF I ] · ξ. (1.13)
Use of the corrected quadratic objective (1.13) solves the problems associated with
the use of UQ discussed above. For example, the policy that maximizes (1.13) subject
to the linearized constraints (1.5) satisfies linear first-order conditions of precisely the
form (1.9). Hence this linear policy will represent a correct linear approximation to
the optimal policy yopt(ξ). The objective (1.13) can also be used to correctly rank
alternative policies (none of which need be fully optimal), as long as these policies
imply that y(0) = y¯. 19
We have remarked above that an advantage of an LQ approximation (when valid)
is that it makes it straightforward to verify that the solution to the LQ problem
represents at least a local welfare maximum, by checking the second-order conditions
for optimality. In our static example, the quadratic objective (1.13) is strictly concave





is negative definite. In this case, the solution to the (linear) first-order conditions
represents a global maximum of Uˆ . Because our approximation is valid only locally,
this only implies that the solution to the LQ problem approximates a local welfare
19Kim and Kim (2006) illustrate how the method expounded here can be used, for example, to
correctly rank alternative policies with regard to international risk-sharing, in an example where
naive LQ analysis sometimes gives an incorrect ranking.
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maximum of the exact problem. Of course, under method (3) above, it would also
have been possible to verify that the solution to the first-order conditions (1.8) rep-
resents a local maximum — and hence that the solution to the linearized conditions
approximates a local maximum — by checking for local concavity in y of the La-
grangian
L(y; ξ;λ) ≡ U(y; ξ) + λF (y; ξ)
associated with the exact policy problem. This would involve checking for negative
definiteness of the matrix Lyy(y¯; 0; λ¯);20 but this is just the matrix (1.14). Thus in
order to check the second-order conditions under this method, one would have to
compute the coefficients of the LQ objective function in any event. Recognizing that
these define a quadratic approximation to the policy objective has the advantage of
not only allowing one to compute a linear approximation to the solution to the first-
order conditions for optimal policy and to verify the second-order conditions, but also
providing a criterion with which to rank suboptimal policies.
The type of correct LQ approximation that we discuss here is not unknown to the
economics literature; in an important early application of this method, Magill (1977)
derives a correct LQ approximation to a multi-sector stochastic optimal growth model
(in which, unlike the case treated by Kydland and Prescott, the constraints are not
linear), using results due to Fleming (1971) in the literature on optimal control. These
results are not directly applicable to the class of problems of interest to us (and fre-
quently encountered in the literature on optimal stabilization policy), however, for
two reasons: we work in discrete time, and we allow for forward-looking constraints
(the equilibrium relations of a macro model derived from optimizing private-sector
behavior), rather than assuming purely backward-looking evolution equations as in
the standard (engineering) theory of optimal control. However, as we show here,
a straightforward extension of the method to the kind of problems frequently en-
countered in the literature on optimal stabilization is possible, allowing a valid LQ
approximation of a fairly general class of discrete-time optimal policy problems.
20Note that strict negative definiteness also implies that the matrix must be non-singular; this
is the condition required for the first-order conditions (1.8) to have a determinate solution. Hence
if one checks the second-order conditions, determinacy of the solution is guaranteed, as one would
expect if each solution must be a local maximum in this case.
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2 LQ Approximation of a Problem with Forward-
Looking Constraints
We now consider a general dynamic optimal policy problem. Suppose that the policy
authority wishes to choose the evolution of a state vector {yt} for t ≥ t0 to maximize





where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, the period objective pi(y, ξ) is a concave function
of y, and ξt is a vector of exogenous disturbances. The evolution of the endogenous
states must satisfy a system of backward-looking structural relations
F (yt,ξt; yt−1) = 0 (2.2)
and a system of forward-looking structural relations
Etg(yt, ξt; yt+1) = 0, (2.3)
that both must hold for each t ≥ t0, given the vector of initial conditions yt0−1.
Conditions of the form (2.2) allow current endogenous variables to depend on
lagged states; for example, these relations could include a technological relation be-
tween the capital stock carried into the next period, current investment expenditure,
and the capital stock carried into the current period.21 Conditions of the form (2.3)
instead allow current endogenous variables to depend on current expectations regard-
ing future states; for example, these relations could include an Euler equation for the
optimal timing of consumer expenditure, relating current consumption to expected
consumption in the next period and the expected rate of return on saving.22 While
the most general notation would allow both leads and lags in all of the structural
equations, supposing that there are equations of these two types will make clearer
21The next period’s capital stock and the current investment expenditure would both be elements
of yt; the vector ξt could include a random disturbance to investment adjustment costs.
22Current consumption and the current period ex-post return on saving in the previous period
would both be elements of yt; the vector ξt could include a random disturbance to the impatience
to consume. Note that without loss of generality we may suppose that the vector ξt includes all
information available in period t regarding future exogenous disturbances.
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the different types of complications arising from the two distinct types of intertempo-
ral linkages. We shall suppose that the number nF of constraints of the first type each
period plus the number ng of constraints of the second type is less than the number
ny of endogenous state variables each period, so that there is at least one dimension
along which policy can continuously vary the outcome yt each period, even the past
and expected future evolution of the endogenous variables. A t0−optimal commit-
ment (the standard Ramsey policy problem) is then the state-contingent evolution
{yt} consistent with equations (2.2)–(2.3) for all t ≥ t0 that maximizes (2.1).
2.1 A Recursive Policy Problem
As is well-known, the presence of the forward-looking constraints (2.3) implies that
a t0−optimal commitment is not generally time-consistent. If, however, we suppose
that a policy to apply from period t0 onward must be chosen subject to an additional
set of constraints on the acceptable values of yt0 , it is possible for the resulting pol-
icy problem to have a recursive structure. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford
(2003, 2005a), we wish to choose initial pre-commitments regarding yt0 that are self-
consistent, in the sense that the policy that is chosen subject to these constraints
would also satisfy constraints of exactly the same form in all later periods as well.
The required initial pre-commitments are of the form
g(yt0−1, ξt0−1; yt0) = g¯t0 , (2.4)
where g¯t0 may depend on the exogenous state at date t0. Note that we assume the
existence of a pre-commitment only about those aspects of yt0 the anticipation of
which back in period t0 − 1 should have been relevant to equilibrium determination
then; there is no need for any stronger form of commitment in order to render optimal
policy time-consistent.
We are thus interested in characterizing the state-contingent policy {yt} for t ≥ t0
that maximizes (2.1) subject to constraints (2.2) – (2.4). Such a policy is optimal from
a timeless perspective if g¯t0 is chosen, as a function of predetermined or exogenous
states at t0, according to a self-consistent rule.
23 This means that the initial pre-
23See Giannoni and Woodford (2002), Woodford (2003, chap. 7), or Benigno and Woodford
(2005a) for further discussion.
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commitment is determined by past conditions through a function
g¯t0 = g¯(ξt0 ,yt0−1), (2.5)
where yt is an extended state vector;
24 this function has the property that under
optimal policy, given this initial pre-commitment, the state-contingent evolution of
the economy will satisfy
g(yt−1, ξt−1; yt) = g¯(ξt,yt−1) (2.6)
in each possible state of the world at each date t ≥ t0 as well. Thus the initial
constraint is of a form that one would optimally commit oneself to satisfy at all
(subsequent) dates.
Let V (g¯t0 ; yt0−1, ξt0−1, ξt0) be the maximum achievable value of the objective (2.1)
in this problem.25 Then the infinite-horizon problem just defined is equivalent to a
sequence of one-period decision problems in which, in each period t ≥ t0, a value of
yt is chosen and state-contingent one-period-ahead pre-commitments g¯t+1(ξt+1) (for
each of the possible states ξt+1 in the following period) are chosen so as to maximize
pi(yt, ξt) + βEtV (g¯t+1; yt, ξt, ξt+1), (2.7)
subject to the constraints
F (yt,ξt; yt−1) = 0,
g(yt−1, ξt−1; yt) = g¯t,
Etg¯t+1 = 0,
given the values of g¯t, yt−1, ξt−1, and ξt, all of which are predetermined and/or exoge-
nous in period t. It is this recursive policy problem that we wish to study; note that
24The extended state vector may include both endogenous and exogenous variables, the values
of which are realized in period t or earlier. For the sake of concreteness, we assume below that
the evolution of the extended state vector, given the evolution of the vectors yt and ξt, is given by
a recursion of the form (2.8), and we assume that the elements of both yt and ξt are among the
elements of yt.
25We assume, to economize on notation, that the exogenous state vector ξt evolves in accor-
dance with a Markov process. Hence ξt summarizes not only all of the disturbances that affect the
structural relations at date t, but all information at date t about the subsequent evolution of the
exogenous disturbances. This is important in order for a time-invariant value function to exist with
the arguments indicated.
16
it is only when we consider this problem (as opposed to the unconstrained Ramsey
problem) that it is possible, in general, to obtain a deterministic steady state as an
optimum in the case of suitable initial conditions, and hence only in this case that we
can hope to approximate the optimal policy problem around such a steady state.26
The solution to the recursive policy problem just defined involves a choice of the
following period’s pre-commitment g¯t+1 of the form
g¯t+1 = g
∗(ξt+1; g¯t, yt−1, ξt−1, ξt),
where g∗ is a time-invariant function. The initial pre-commitment (2.5) is then self-
consistent if
g∗(ξt+1; g¯(ξt,yt−1), yt−1, ξt−1, ξt) = g¯(ξt+1, ψ(ξt, yt,yt−1))
for all possible values of ξt+1, ξt, yt, and yt−1, where ψ(·) is the vector of functions in
the system of identities
yt = ψ(ξt, yt,yt−1) (2.8)
that describe the evolution of the extended state vector. Note that this implies that
equation (2.6) is satisfied at all times.
2.2 A Correct LQ Local Approximation
As in the static problem treated in the previous section, our method involves a local
approximation to both the objective and the constraints, near an optimal policy for
the case of zero disturbances. We furthermore assume both an initial state yt0−1
and initial pre-commitments g¯t0 such that the optimal policy in the case of zero
disturbances is a steady state, i.e., such that yt = y¯ for all t, for some vector y¯. (More
precisely, our calculations below assume that both yt0−1 and g¯t0−1 are close enough
to being consistent with this steady state.) In order to define this steady state, we
must consider the nature of optimal policy in the exact problem just defined.
26In the literature on Ramsey policy, one sometimes sees approximate characterizations of optimal
policy computed by log-linearizing around a steady state that Ramsey policy approaches asymptot-
ically in the absence of random disturbances. But in such a case, there is no guarantee that the
approximate characterization would be accurate even in the case of arbitrarily small disturbances,
as Ramsey policy need not be near the steady state except asymptotically.
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The first-order conditions for the exact policy problem can obtained by differen-
tiating a Lagrangian of the form









where λt and ϕt are Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (2.2) and (2.3)
respectively, for any date t ≥ t0, and we use the notation β−1ϕt0−1 for the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the additional constraint (2.4). This last notational choice
allows the first-order conditions to be expressed in the same way for all periods.
Optimality requires that the joint evolution of the processes {yt, ξt, λt, ϕt} satisfy
Dypi(yt, ξt) + λt
′DyF (yt, ξt; yt−1) + βEtλt+1
′DyˇF (yt+1, ξt+1; yt)
+Etϕt
′Dyg(yt, ξt; yt+1) + β
−1ϕt−1
′Dyˆg(yt−1, ξt−1; yt) = 0 (2.10)
at each date t ≥ t0, where Dy denotes the vector of partial derivatives of any of the
functions with respect to the elements of yt, while Dyˆ means the vector of partial
derivatives with respect to the elements of yt+1 and Dyˇ means the vector of partial
derivatives with respect to the elements of yt−1.
An optimal steady state is then described by a collection of vectors (y¯, λ¯, ϕ¯) sat-
isfying
Dypi(y¯, 0) + λ¯
′
DyF (y¯, 0; y¯) + βλ¯
′
DyˇF (y¯, 0; y¯)
+ϕ¯′Dyg(y¯, 0; y¯) + β
−1ϕ¯′Dyˆg(y¯, 0; y¯) = 0, (2.11)
F (y¯, 0; y¯) = 0, (2.12)
g(y¯, 0; y¯) = 0. (2.13)
We shall suppose that such a steady state exists, and assume (in the policy problem
with random disturbances) an initial state yt0−1 near y¯ — more precisely, such that
yt0−1 − y¯ = O(||ξ||) — and an initial pre-commitment such that g¯t0 = O(||ξ||) as
well.27 Once the optimal steady state has been computed, we make no further use
of conditions (2.10); our proposed method does not require that we directly seek to
solve these equations.
Instead, we now consider local approximations to the objective and constraints
near an optimal steady state. We can compute a second-order Taylor expansion of
27Note that the steady-state value of g¯ is equal to g(y¯, 0; y¯) = 0.
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the period objective function pi, obtaining an expression of exactly the form (1.3).










yypi · y˜t + y˜′tD2yξpi · ξt
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (2.14)
This would be used as the quadratic objective in what we have called the “naive” LQ
approximation. Under our alternative approach, we must substitute purely quadratic
terms for the linear terms Dypi · y˜t in this sum.
A similar second-order Taylor series approximation can be written for each of the
functions F k. It follows that
∞∑
t=t0













































k · y˜t + 2y˜′tD2yyˇF k · y˜t−1
]}
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (2.15)





































































i · y˜t + 2β−1y˜′tD2yˆygi · y˜t−1
]}
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (2.17)
where we have used (2.15) and (2.16) to substitute for the F and g terms respectively.






Φ · y˜t + 1
2
[




Φ ≡ λ¯′[DyF + βDyˇF ] + ϕ¯′[Dyg + β−1Dyˆg],
H ≡ λ¯k[D2yyF k + βD2yˇyˇF k] + ϕ¯i[D2yygi + β−1D2yˆyˆgi],
R ≡ λ¯kD2yyˇF k + ϕ¯iβ−1D2yˆygi,
Z(L) ≡ βλ¯kD2yˇξF k + (λ¯kD2yξF k + ϕ¯iD2yξgi) · L+ β−1ϕ¯iD2yˆξgi · L2.
Using (2.11), we furthermore observe that29
Φ = −Dypi.
28Note that we here include (2.4) among the constraints that a policy must satisfy. We shall
call any evolution that satisfies (2.2)–(2.3) a “feasible” policy. Under this weaker assumption, the
left-hand sides of (2.17) and (2.18) must instead be replaced by β−1ϕ¯′g(yt0−1, ξt0−1; yt0).
29This is the point at which our calculations rely on the assumption that the steady state around
which we compute our local approximations is optimal.
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which can in turn be used to substitute for the linear terms in (2.14). We thus obtain













Q ≡ D2yypi +H,
B(L) ≡ Z(L) +D2yξpi · L. (2.20)
Since (2.19) involves no linear terms, it can be evaluated (up to a residual of order
O(||ξ||3)) using only a linear approximation to the evolution of y˜t under a given policy
rule.
It follows that a correct LQ approximation to the original problem is given by
the problem of choosing a state-contingent evolution {y˜t} for t ≥ t0 to maximize the
objective













subject to the constraints that
C(L)y˜t = ft, (2.22)
EtD(L)y˜t+1 = ht (2.23)
for all t ≥ t0, and the additional initial constraint that
D(L)y˜t0 = h˜t0 , (2.24)
where now
A(L) ≡ Q+ 2R · L, (2.25)
30Here we include g¯t0 among the “terms independent of policy.” If we consider also policies
that are not necessarily consistent with the initial pre-commitment, the left-hand side of (2.19) is
more generally equal to Vt0 + β
−1ϕ¯′g(yt0−1, ξt0−1; yt0). This generalization of (2.19) is used in the
derivation of equation (4.3) below.
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C(L) ≡ DyF +DyˇF · L, (2.26)
ft ≡ −DξF · ξt,
D(L) ≡ Dyˆg +Dyg · L, (2.27)
ht ≡ −Dξg · ξt,
h˜t0 ≡ ht0−1 + g¯t0 .
2.3 An Equivalent Lagrangian Approach
In the case that the objective (2.21) is concave,31 the first-order conditions associated
with the LQ problem just defined characterize the solution to that problem. Here
we show that these linear equations also correspond to a local linear approximation
to the first-order conditions associated with the exact problem, i.e., the modified
Ramsey policy problem defined in section 2.1, and hence that the solution to the LQ
problem represents a local linear approximation to optimal policy from a timeless
perspective.32
As already noted, the first-order conditions for the exact policy problem are ob-
tained by differentiating the Lagrangian Lt0 defined in (2.9). This yields the system of
first-order conditions (2.10). The linearization of these first-order conditions around
the optimal steady state is in turn the set of linear equations that would be ob-
tained by differentiating a quadratic approximation to Lt0 around that same steady
state. Hence we are interested in computing such a local approximation, for the case
in which yt − y¯, λt − λ¯, and ϕt − ϕ¯ are each of order O(||ξ||) for all t. (Here the
steady-state values of the Lagrange multipliers λ¯, ϕ¯ are again given by the solution
to equations (2.11) – (2.13).)
We may furthermore write the Lagrangian in the form
Lt0 = L¯t0 + L˜t0 ,
where











31The algebraic conditions under which this is so are discussed in the next section.
32See also Levine et al. (2006) for a similar discussion of the equivalence between our approach













λ˜t ≡ λt − λ¯, ϕ˜t ≡ ϕt − ϕ¯.
We can then use equations (2.14) and (2.17) to show that the local quadratic approx-
imation to L¯t0 is given by33
L¯t0 = V Qt0 + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
In addition, the fact that λ˜t, ϕ˜t are both of order O(||ξ||) means that a local quadratic












where F˜ and g˜ are local linear approximations to the functions F and g respectively.
Hence the local quadratic approximation to the complete Lagrangian is given by











But this is identical (up to terms independent of policy) to the Lagrangian for the LQ
problem of maximizing V Qt0 subject to the linearized constraints. Hence the first-order
conditions obtained from this approximate Lagrangian (which coincide with the local
linear approximation to the first-order conditions for the exact problem) are identical
to the first-order conditions for the LQ problem, and their solutions are identical as
well.
3 Characterizing Optimal Policy
We now study necessary and sufficient conditions for a policy to solve the LQ problem
of maximizing (2.21) subject to constraints (2.22) – (2.24). The Lagrangian for this
33It is worth noting that this equality holds in the case of all feasible policies, whether or not the
policy is consistent with the initial pre-commitment (2.4). This is important for our discussion of
the welfare evaluation of suboptimal policies in section 4.
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(Note that this is just (2.28), omitting the terms independent of policy and those




Et{[A(L) + A′(βL−1)]y˜t}+ Et[B(L)ξt+1]
+Et[C
′(βL−1)λ˜t] + β
−1D′(βL−1)ϕ˜t−1 = 0 (3.1)
that must hold for each t ≥ t0 under an optimal policy. (Here we use the notation
X ′ for the transpose of a matrix X.) These conditions, together with (2.22) – (2.24),
form a linear system to be solved for the joint evolution of the processes {y˜t, λ˜t, ϕ˜t}
given the exogenous disturbance processes {ξt} and the initial conditions y˜t0−1 and the
initial pre-commitment g¯t0 (or hˆt0). This type of system of linear stochastic difference
equations is easy to solve using standard methods.




βt−t0 y˜′ty˜t <∞. (3.2)




we see that H is simply the space of stationary (square-summable) processes. We
are interested in solutions to the LQ problem that satisfy the bound (3.2) because it
guarantees that the objective V Q is well-defined (and is generically required for it to
be so). Of course, our LQ approximation to the original problem is only guaranteed
to be accurate in the case that y˜t is always sufficiently small; hence a solution to the
LQ problem in which y˜t grows without bound, but at a slow enough rate for (3.2)
to be satisfied, need not correspond (even approximately) to any optimum (or local
optimum) of the exact problem. In this section, however, we take the LQ problem at
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fact value, and discuss the conditions under which it has a solution, despite the fact
that we may only be interested in bounded solutions.
Introducing correspondingly rescaled Lagrange multipliers {λˆt, ϕˆt} as well, the
system of necessary conditions for an optimum consisting of (2.22), (2.23) and (3.1)
can be written in the matrix form
Et[M(L,L
−1)zt] = xt (3.4)
where
M(L,L−1) ≡
 0 0 C(β
1/2L)
0 0 β−1/2L−1D(β1/2L)








and xt is a vector of (correspondingly rescaled) exogenous disturbances known in
period t. Conditions (3.4) must be satisfied for all t ≥ t0.
As usual, the existence of a unique square-summable solution {zt} to this system
(corresponding to a solution {y˜t} ∈ H) for given initial conditions zt0−1 and a square-
summable forcing process {xt} depends on the roots of the characteristic polynomial
associated with the equation system. The characteristic polynomial is given by34
∆(z) ≡ det[zM(z−1, z)] = 0. (3.5)
The condition required (generically) for a unique square-summable solution is that
equation (3.5) have exactly n roots such that |z| < 1, where n = nF + ng + ny is
the dimension of the square matrix M . This condition is satisfied in our case, under
the important proviso that (3.5) have no roots with a modulus exactly equal to 1.
34It follows from condition (i) of Lemma 2, stated below, that in the case of any concave problem,
the function ∆(z) defined here is not identically equal to zero. We shall restrict our attention to
problems satisfying this condition, for reasons discussed below. Hence (3.5) is a polynomial equation
with a set of isolated (possibly complex) roots.
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And while this last condition is far from innocuous,35 we show below that it must be
satisfied in the case of a concave problem, which is the only case in which a solution to
the first-order conditions (even if one exists) will correspond to an optimum. Hence
we may restrict our attention to problems in which it is satisfied.
Note that the matrix operator M has the symmetry property
M(L,L−1) =M(L−1, L)′. (3.6)
It follows from this that in the case of any z 6= 0 satisfying (3.5), z−1 is also a solution.
Hence the non-zero roots occur in reciprocal pairs. Under the assumption that there
are no roots such that |z| = 1, it follows that there must be exactly k roots with
|z| < 1 and k roots with |z| > 1, for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n, while the other roots (if any)
are all equal to zero. It also follows from (3.6) that if λj is the smallest power of
λ with a non-zero coefficient in the polynomial (3.5), then λ2n−j will be the largest
power of λ with a non-zero coefficient (and indeed these two coefficients will be the
same). Hence we must have j = n − k, so that there are exactly n − k roots equal
to zero. We then observe that there are exactly n roots with |z| < 1, which is the
condition for a determinate solution.










where T is a stable matrix, the eigenvalues of which correspond to the roots |z| < 1
of (3.5), and Ψ(L) is a lag polynomial of order 1, because one lag of the disturbances
35One might think that in a generic problem there should be no roots with modulus exactly equal
to 1. However, as we show in the next paragraph, the roots of (3.5) necessarily occur in reciprocal
pairs. It is possible for the 2k non-zero roots to correspond to k − 1 roots with modulus less than
1, the k − 1 reciprocals of these, and a pair of complex roots with modulus exactly equal to 1
that are reciprocals of one another. In such a case, a small perturbation of the model parameters
will necessarily result in nearby coefficients for the matrices in (3.5), but still possessing the same
symmetry property, so that there will continue to be a complex pair with modulus exactly equal to
1.
36In writing the solution in this form, we use the fact that {ξt} is assumed to be a Markov process,
and assume furthermore that it has a linear law of motion, so that conditional expectations Etξt+j
can all be written as linear functions of ξt. In the case that the disturbance processes are not linear,
the final term in (3.7) is instead a nonlinear function of ξt, and if the disturbances are not Markovian,
the solution must be written as a function of the conditional expectations Etξt+j for j ≥ 0. In all
cases, the solution is linear in the conditional expectations.
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appears in (3.1). The solution does not depend on λˆt−1, because equations (3.1)
do not. Moreover, we can similarly solve for λˆt as a linear function of ϕˆt−1, yˆt−1,
and ξt, but we do not need this equation in order to solve for the dynamics of the
state variables {yˆt} under optimal policy. Equations (3.7) can be solved for ϕˆt0 and
yˆt0 given initial conditions ϕˆt0−1 and yˆt0−1; and then one can solve these equations
recursively, computing the state-contingent values of ϕˆt and yˆt in any period once the
state-contingent values for the previous period have been computed.
This method allows us to obtain a unique square-summable solution to the first-
order conditions (3.1) corresponding to any assumed values for the initial multipliers
ϕˆt0−1. These multipliers are not given, and must themselves be solved for; but we seek
a solution that also satisfies (2.24). Let d(ϕˆt0−1, yˆt0−1, ξˆt0) be the value of D(L)y˜t0
implied by the solution for yˆt0 given in (3.7). Then the initial multipliers ϕˆt0−1
associated with the initial pre-commitment are those that satisfy the equation
d(ϕˆt0−1, yˆt0−1, ξˆt0) = h˜t0 . (3.8)
Equation (3.8) together with (3.7) allows us to determine the state-contingent evo-
lution {y˜t} that simultaneously satisfies the constraints (2.22) – (2.24) and the first-
order conditions (3.1).
The fact that the matrix T is stable (has all eigenvalues with modulus less than
1) implies that the process {yˆt} that solves these equations will be bounded if the
rescaled disturbance processes {ξˆt} are bounded. However, this is consistent with
growth in the original state variables y˜t to grow at a rate as large as β
−t/2, and if
they do, the state variables yt will eventually, with high probability, be far from the
steady-state values y¯ around which we have computed our local approximations, and
hence our local approximations may not be at all accurate as a characterization of
optimal policy. However, if the largest of the k roots of (3.5) inside the unit circle
has a modulus |z| < β1/2, then the eigenvalues of T all have a modulus less than β1/2,










and the fact that T˜ is stable implies that {y˜t} will be bounded if the disturbances
{ξt} are bounded. In this case, a sufficiently small bound on the amplitude of the
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exogenous disturbances will imply that the solution to the first-order conditions re-
mains forever in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the steady state, so that our
local approximations should be highly accurate.
The first-order conditions (3.1) are easily shown to be necessary for optimality,
but they are not generally sufficient for optimality as well; one must also verify that
second-order conditions for optimality are satisfied. (In the case of an LQ problem,
satisfaction of the second-order conditions implies global, and not just local, optimal-
ity; so we need not check any further conditions. But because our LQ problem is
only a local approximation to the original policy problem, a global optimum of the
LQ problem still may only correspond to a local optimum of the exact problem.) We
next consider these additional conditions.
Let us consider the subspace H1 ⊂ H of sequences ψ ∈ H that satisfy the con-
straints
C(L)ψt = 0 (3.10)
EtD(L)ψt+1 = 0 (3.11)
for each date t ≥ t0, along with the initial commitments
D(L)ψt0 = 0, (3.12)
where we define ψt0−1 ≡ 0 in writing (3.10) for period t = t0 and in writing (3.12).
This subspace is of interest because if a process y˜ ∈ H satisfies constraints (2.22) –
(2.24), another process yˆ ∈ H with yˆt0−1 = y˜t0−1 satisfies those constraints as well if
and only if yˆ − y˜ ∈ H1. We may now state our main result.
Proposition 1 For {y˜t} ∈ H to maximize the quadratic form (2.21), subject to the
constraints (2.22) – (2.24) given initial conditions y˜t0−1 and g¯t0, it is necessary and
sufficient that (i) there exist Lagrange multiplier processes37 ϕ˜, λ˜ ∈ H such that the
processes {y˜t, ϕ˜t, λ˜t} satisfy (3.1) for each t ≥ t0; and (ii)






βt−t0 [ψ′tA(L)ψt] ≤ 0 (3.13)
for all processes ψ ∈ H1, where in evaluating (3.13) we define ψt0−1 ≡ 0. A process
{y˜t} with these properties is furthermore uniquely optimal if and only if
V Q(ψ) < 0 (3.14)
37Note that ϕ˜t is also assumed to be defined for t = t0 − 1.
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for all processes ψ ∈ H1 that are non-zero almost surely.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The case in which the stronger condition
(3.14) holds — i.e., the quadratic form V Q(ψ) is negative definite on the subspace
H1 — is the one of primary interest to us, since it is in this case that we know that
the process {y˜t} represents at least a local welfare maximum in the exact problem.
In this case we can also show that pure randomization of policy reduces the welfare
objective (2.21), and hence is locally welfare-reducing in the exact problem as well,
as is discussed further in Benigno and Woodford (2005a).
We can furthermore establish a useful characterization of the algebraic condi-
tions under which the second-order conditions (3.14) are satisfied. In stating these






= nF + ng. (3.15)
This condition must hold in order for the constraints (2.22) – (2.23) to include neither
any redundant constraints nor any constraints that are inconsistent in the case of
generic forcing processes {ft, ht}.
Lemma 2 Suppose that regularity condition (3.15) holds. Then the second-order
condition for the previous optimization problem is satisfied — i.e., (3.14) is satisfied
by all processes ψ ∈ H1 that are non-zero almost surely — if and only if (i) every
northwest principal minor of the bordered Hermitian matrix
M¯(θ) ≡M(e−iθ, eiθ) (3.16)
of order p > 2(nF + ng) has the same sign as (−1)p−nF−ng for all −pi ≤ θ ≤ pi; and




T ′j[S ′(A0 + A′0)S + β
1/2T ′S ′A1S + β
1/2S ′A′1ST ]T
j (3.17)
is negative definite, i.e., , for each 1 ≤ p ≤ ng, the northwest principal minor of
J of order p has the same sign as (−1)p. Here A0, A1 are the matrices such that
A(L) = A0 + A1L, and
S ≡ [0 I]
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is the ny × (ng + ny) matrix that selects the last ny elements of a vector of length
ng + ny, and T is the matrix in (3.7).
The proof of this lemma is also given in the Appendix. Note that because we assume
that ny > nF + ng, condition (i) of this lemma necessarily implies that the the
determinant of M¯(θ), the principal minor of order p = n, must have the same sign
for all θ. Hence there can be no root of ∆(z) of the form z = eiθ, which is to say,
no root for which |z| = 1. Thus as mentioned earlier, our maintained assumption in
solving the first-order necessary conditions (3.4) follows from one of the second-order
necessary conditions. The fact that condition (i) implies that we can solve the system
(3.4), as discussed above, also allows us to define the matrix J that is used in stating
condition (ii).
The fact that condition (ii) is needed in addition to condition (i) in order to ensure
that we have a concave problem indicates an important respect in which the theory
of LQ optimization with forward-looking constraints is not a trivial generalization
of the standard theory for backward-looking problems.38 (Condition (i) is instead a
direct generalization of the condition given in Telser and Graves (1972) for the case of
a deterministic, backward-looking LQ problem.) It also shows that the second-order
conditions for a stochastic problem are more complex than they would be in the case of
a deterministic policy problem (again, unlike what is true of purely backward-looking
LQ problems). Because of our assumption of an initial pre-commitment (2.24), the
deterministic LQ problem corresponding to the one considered here would be one of
choosing a sequence {y˜t} for t ≥ t0 to maximize V Qt0 (y˜; ξ) subject to the constraints
that
C(L)y˜t = ft, D(L)y˜t = h˜t
for all t ≥ t0, where {ξt, ft, h˜t} are specified deterministic sequences and y˜t0−1 is
given as an initial condition. This deterministic problem is a standard backward-
looking problem of the kind treated in the optimal control literature, and hence the
characterization of the second-order conditions given in Telser and Graves (1972) is
applicable. In fact (as shown in the Appendix), the required condition is simply
condition (i) of Lemma 2.
38In some cases, condition (i) is both necessary and sufficient for concavity, even in the presence of
forward-looking constraints. The problem treated in Benigno and Woodford (2005a) is an example
of this kind.
30
But this is not generally a sufficient condition to guarantee that (3.14) is satisfied,
in the presence of forward-looking constraints (2.23), if policy randomization is al-
lowed.39 Because constraints (2.23) need hold only in expected value, random policy
may be able to vary the paths of the endogenous variables (in some states of the
world) in directions that would not be possible in the corresponding deterministic
problem, and this makes the algebraic conditions required for (3.14) to hold more
stringent.
A simple example may clarify this point. Suppose that yt has two elements,
and that the only constraint on what policy can achieve is a single, forward-looking
constraint
Et[δy˜1t − y˜1,t+1] = 0 (3.18)
for all t ≥ t0, where δ < β−1/2. (The path of {y˜2t} can be freely chosen, subject to
the bound (3.2).) An initial pre-commitment specifies the value that y˜1,t0 must have.
In the corresponding deterministic problem, constraint (3.18) implies that one must
have
y˜1,t+1 = δy˜1t
for each t ≥ t0, and this, together with the pre-commitment, uniquely determines
the entire path of the sequence {y˜1t} that must be brought about by deterministic
policy. Hence the second-order condition for the deterministic problem requires only
that the objective be a concave function of the path of {y˜2t}. But if random policies
are considered, it is also possible for {y˜1t} to evolve in accordance with any law of
motion
y˜1,t+1 = δy˜1t + ²t+1,
where {²t} is any martingale difference sequence with a suitable bound on its asymp-
totic variance; in this simple example, the set of possible evolutions {y˜1t} is inde-
pendent of the evolution chosen for {y˜2t}. Whether randomization of the path of
{y˜1t} can increase the value of the policy objective obviously depends on terms in the
objective involving the path of {y˜1t} (including cross terms), and not just the terms
39Our remarks here apply even in the case that the “fundamental” disturbances {ξt} are purely de-
terministic; what matters is whether policy may be contingent upon random events. As is discussed
further in Benigno and Woodford (2005a), when the second-order conditions fail to hold, policy
randomization can be welfare-improving, even when the random variations in policy are unrelated
to any variation in fundamentals.
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involving the path of {y˜2t}. Hence the conditions required for a concave optimization
problem are more stringent in this case.40
4 Welfare Evaluation of Alternative Policy Rules
We have argued that another advantage of our approach is that it can be used not
only to derive a linear approximation to a fully optimal policy commitment, but also
to compute approximate welfare comparisons between alternative rules (neither of
which may be fully optimal), that will correctly rank these rules in the case that
random disturbances are small enough. Because empirically realistic models are in-
evitably fairly complex, a fully optimal policy rule is likely to be too complex to
represent a realistic policy proposal; hence comparisons among alternative simple
(though suboptimal) rules are of considerable practical interest. Here we discuss how
this can be done.
We do not propose to simply evaluate (a local approximation to) expected dis-
counted utility Vt0 under a candidate policy rule, because the optimal policy locally
characterized above (i.e., optimal policy “from a timeless perspective”) does not max-
imize this objective; hence ranking rules according to this criterion would lead to the
embarrassing conclusion that there exist policies better than the optimal policy. (We
could, of course, define “optimal policy” as the policy that maximizes Vt0 ; but this
would result in a time-inconsistent policy recommendation, as noted earlier.) Thus
we wish to use a criterion that ranks rules according to how close they come to solving
the recursive policy problem defined in section 2.1, rather than how close they come
to maximizing Vt0 .
Of course, if we restrict our attention to policies that necessarily satisfy the initial
pre-commitment (2.4), there is no problem; our optimal rule will be the one that
maximizes Vt0 , or (in the case of small enough shocks) the one that maximizes V
Q
t0 .
But simple policy rules are unlikely to precisely satisfy (2.4); thus in order to be able
to select the best rule from some simple class, we need an alternative criterion, one
that is defined for all policies that are close enough to being optimal, in a sense that
is to be defined. At the same time, we wish it to be a criterion the maximization of
which implies that one has solved the constrained optimization problem defined in




Our Lagrangian characterization of optimal policy suggests such a criterion. The
timelessly optimal policy from date t0 onward — that is, the policy that maximizes
Vt0 subject to the initial constraint (2.4) in addition to the feasibility constraints
(2.2)–(2.3) — is also the policy that maximizes the Lagrangian
V modt0 ≡ Vt0 + β−1ϕ′t0−1g(yt0−1, ξt0−1; yt0), (4.1)
where ϕt0−1 is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the initial constraint
(2.4). This is a function that coincides (up to a constant) with the objective Vt0 in
the case of policies satisfying the constraint (2.4), but that is defined more generally,
and that is maximized over the broader class of feasible policies by the timelessly
optimal policy. Hence an appropriate criterion to use in ranking alternative policies
is the value of V modt0 associated with each one. This criterion penalizes policies that
fail to satisfy the initial pre-commitment (2.4), by exactly the amount by which a
previously anticipated deviation of that kind would have reduced the expected utility
of the representative household.
In the case of any policy that satisfies the feasibility constraints (2.2)–(2.3) for all
t ≥ t0, we observe that
V modt0 = L¯t0 + β−1ϕ˜′t0−1g(yt0−1, ξt0−1; yt0)
= V Qt0 + β
−1ϕ˜′t0−1g˜(yt0−1, ξt0−1; yt0) + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
= V Qt0 + β
−1ϕ˜′t0−1Dyˆg · y˜t0 + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
This suggests that in the case of small enough shocks, the ranking of alternative
policies in terms of V modt0 will correspond to the ranking in terms of the welfare
measure
Wt0 ≡ V Qt0 + β−1ϕ˜′t0−1Dyˆg · y˜t0 . (4.2)
Note that in this derivation we have assumed that y˜t = O(||ξ||). This will be true
in the equilibrium associated with any (sufficiently differentiable) policy rule that
is consistent with the optimal steady state in the absence of random disturbances.
We shall restrict attention to policy rules of this kind. Note that while this is an
important restriction, it does not preclude consideration of extremely simple rules;
and it is a property of the simple rules of greatest interest, i.e., those that come closest
to being optimal among rules of that degree of complexity.
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In expression (4.1), and hence in (4.2), ϕt0−1 is the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with constraint (2.4) under the optimal policy. However, in order to evaluate
Wt0 to second-order accuracy, it suffices to have a first-order approximation to this
multiplier. Such an approximation is given by the multiplier ϕ˜t0−1 associated with
the constraint (2.24) of the LQ problem. Thus we need only solve the LQ problem,
as discussed in the previous section — obtaining a value for ϕ˜t0−1 from equation
(3.8) — in order to determine the function Wt0 . Moreover, we observe that in this
solution, ϕ˜t0−1 = O(||ξ||). Thus a solution for the equilibrium evolution {y˜t} under
a given policy that is accurate to first order suffices to evaluate the second term
in (4.2) to second-order accuracy. Hence Wt0 inherits this property of V
Q
t0 , and it
suffices to compute a linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics {y˜t} under
each candidate policy rule in order to evaluate Wt0 to second-order accuracy. We can
therefore obtain an approximation solution for {y˜t} under a given policy by solving
the linearized structural equations (2.22)–(2.23), together with the policy rule, and
use this solution in evaluating Wt0 . In this way welfare comparisons among alter-
native policies are possible, to second-order accuracy, using linear approximations to
the model structural relations and a quadratic welfare objective.
Moreover, we can evaluate Wt0 to second-order accuracy using only a linear ap-
proximation to the policy rule. This has important computational advantages. For
example, if we wish to find the optimal policy rule from among the family of simple
rules of the form it = φ(yt), where it is a policy instrument, and we are content to




parameterized by the vector of coefficients f. There are no possible second-order (or
larger) welfare gains resulting from nonlinearities in the policy rule.
It is important to note that these conclusions obtain only because we evaluate
welfare taking into account the welfare losses that would result from a violation of
the initial pre-commitment if it were to have been anticipated. Some would prefer
to evaluate alternative simple policy rules by computing the expected value of Vt0
41Here we restrict attention to rules that are consistent with the optimal steady state, so that the
intercept term is zero when the rule is expressed in terms of deviations from steady-state values.
Note that a rule without this property will result in lower welfare, in the case of any small enough
disturbances.
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(rather than V modt0 ) associated with each rule (e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004c).
As noted above, this alternative criterion is one under which the optimal rule from
a timeless perspective can be dominated by other rules, a point stressed by Blake
(2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002), among others. The alternative criterion is
also one that cannot be evaluated to second-order accuracy using only a first-order
solution for the equilibrium evolution under a given policy. For a general feasible
policy — consistent with the optimal steady state, but not necessarily consistent
with the initial pre-commitment (2.4) — we can show that42
Vt0 = V
Q
t0 − β−1ϕ¯′Dyˆg · y˜t0 + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (4.3)
The first term on the right-hand side of this expression is purely quadratic (has zero
linear terms), but this is not true of the second term, if the initial pre-commitment
is binding under the optimal policy. Evaluation of the second term to second-order
accuracy requires a second-order approximation to the evolution {yt} under the policy
of interest; there is thus no alternative to the use of higher-order perturbation solution
methods as illustrated by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, and nonlinear terms in the policy
rule generally matter for welfare.43
In expression (4.2), the value of the multiplier ϕ˜t0−1 depends on the economy’s
initial state and on the value of the initial pre-commitment g¯t0 . If we assume a self-
consistent constraint (2.5), the solution to (3.8) is given by a linear function44
ϕ˜t0−1 = ϕ
∗(yt0−1), (4.4)
42Here we use the more general form of (2.19) mentioned in footnote 29.
43Thus welfare comparisons of the kind proposed by Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002), or
Sauer (2006), in which the implications of a policy rule are computed using the structural equations
of a canonical log-linearized New Keynesian model and welfare is evaluated using the canonical
quadratic loss function, cannot be justified as representing a quadratic approximation to the expected
utility of the representative household in a micro-founded model with Calvo price adjustment. The
welfare criterion proposed here can instead be computed using the usual log-linearized structural
equations, as is discussed further in Benigno and Woodford (2005a, sec. 5).
44One might suppose that the value of the multiplier should also depend on ξt0, as g¯t0 does in
general. But the form of the last constraint in the recursive problem (2.7) implies that in the solution
to this problem, g¯t+1(ξt+1) is chosen so that the value of the multiplier ϕt associated with the initial
pre-commitment in the continuation problem is independent of the state ξt+1, though it may depend
on ξt. If the initial pre-commitment at date t0 is chosen in a self-consistent way, it also has this
property.
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the algebraic form of which is discussed in the Appendix. Then we can write45
Wt0 = W (y˜;yt0−1) ≡ V Qt0 + β−1ϕ∗(yt0−1)′Dyˆg · y˜t0 . (4.5)
This gives us an expression for our welfare measure purely in terms of the history
and subsequent evolution of the extended state vector.
Let us suppose that we are interested in evaluating a policy rule r that implies an
equilibrium evolution of the endogenous variables of the form46
yt = φr(yt−1, ξt). (4.6)
Then given this solution for the evolution {yt}, we can evaluate (4.5), obtaining
Wt0 = Wr(yt0−1, ξt0).





in order to determine the optimal rule from among the members of some family of
rules R.
However, the solution to problem (4.7) may well depend on the initial conditions
yt0−1 and ξt0 for which Wt0 is evaluated.
47 This leads to the possibility of an unap-
pealing degree of arbitrariness of the choice that would be recommended from within
some family of simple rules, as well as time inconsistency of the policy recommenda-
tion: a rule chosen at date t0 on the ground that it solves problem (4.7) need not be
found to also solve the corresponding problem at some later date, though the calcu-
lation at date t0 assumes that rule r is to be followed forever. One way of avoiding
this might be to assume that one should choose the rule that would be judged best
in the case of initial conditions consistent with the optimal steady state, whether the
45In writing the functionW (·), and others that follow, we suppress the argument ξ, as the evolution
of the exogenous disturbances is the same in the case of each of the alternative policies under
consideration.
46This assumption that yt depends only on the state variables indicated is without loss of gener-
ality, as we can extend the vector yt if necessary in order for this to be so.
47This is not a problem if the family of rules R includes a fully optimal rule r∗, since the same
rule r∗ solves the problem (2.7) for all possible values of the initial conditions. But the result can
easily depend on the initial conditions if we restrict attention to a family of suboptimal rules.
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economy’s actual initial state is that one or not;48 that is, one would choose the rule




This choice would not be time-inconsistent, but the choice is still an arbitrary one.
In particular, the decision to evaluate Wr assuming initial conditions consistent with
the steady state — when in fact the state of the economy will fluctuate on both sides
of the steady-state position — favors rules r for which Wr is a less concave function
of the initial condition.
The criterion that we find most appealing is accordingly to integrate over a dis-
tribution of possible initial conditions, rather than evaluating Wr at the economy’s
actual state at the time of the choice, or at any other single state (such as the opti-
mal steady state). Suppose that in the case of the optimal policy rule r∗, the laws
of motion (2.8) and (4.6) imply that the evolution of the extended state vector {yt}
is stationary.49 In this case, there exists a well-defined invariant (or unconditional)
probability distribution µ for the possible values of yt under the optimal policy.
50
Then we can define the optimal policy rule within some class of simple rules R as the





W¯r(yt) ≡ EtWr(yt, ξt+1). (4.9)
Because of the linearity of our approximate characterization of optimal policy, the cal-
culations required in order to evaluate Eµ[Wr] to second-order accuracy are straight-
forward; these are illustrated in Benigno and Woodford (2005a, sec. 5).
The most important case in which the method just described cannot be applied
is when some of the elements of {yt} possess unit roots, though all elements are at
48This approach is proposed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004c), though they use Vt0 rather
than V modt0 as the criterion to be maximized.
49Benigno and Woodford (2005a) provide an example of an optimal monetary stabilization policy
problem in which this is case.
50We discuss the computation of the relevant properties of this invariant measure in the Appendix.
51Recall that we assume that the exogenous disturbance process {ξt} is Markovian, and that
ξt is included among the elements of yt. Hence yt contains all relevant elements of the period t
information set for the calculation of this conditional expectation.
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least difference-stationary (and some of the non-stationary elements may be cointe-








Et[yT − (T − t)γ]
is the Beveridge-Nelson (1981) “trend” component, using the notation γ ≡ E[∆y] for
the vector of unconditional means of the first differences, and the “cyclical” compo-
nent yt
cyc will still be a stationary process. Moreover, the evolution of the cyclical
component as a function of the exogenous disturbances under the optimal policy will
be independent of the assumed initial value of the trend component (though not of
the initial value of the cyclical component). It follows that we can define an invariant
distribution µ for the possible values of yt
cyc under the optimal policy, that is inde-
pendent of the assumed value for the trend component. Then for any assumed initial
value for the trend component yt0−1
tr, we can define the optimal policy rule within




tr) ≡ Eµ[W¯r(yt0−1)], (4.10)
a generalization of (4.8).53
It might seem in this case that our criterion is again dependent on initial con-




tr) + Ω2r, (4.11)
where the first component is the same for all rules of the kind that we consider,
while the second component is independent of the initial condition yt0−1
tr. Hence
the criterion (4.10) establishes the same ranking of alternative rules, regardless of the
initial condition.
52Benigno and Woodford (2003) provide an example of an optimal stabilization policy problem in
which the LQ approximate problem has this property. In this example, the unit root is associated
with the dynamics of the level of real public debt, which display a unit root under optimal policy
for the same reason as in the classic analysis of optimal tax smoothing by Barro (1979) and Sargent
(1987, chap. XV).
53In the case that all elements of yt are stationary, yttr is simply a constant, and all variations in
yt correspond to variations in ytcyc. In this case, (4.10) is equivalent to the previous criterion (4.8).
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We can show this as follows. In accordance with our previous discussion, we
restrict attention to a class of rules R with the property that each rule in the class
implies convergence to the same long-run values of the state variables as under optimal
policy, in the absence of stochastic disturbances. Because we analyze the dynamics
under a given policy using a linearized version of the structural relations, certainty-
equivalence obtains, and it follows that the limiting behavior (as T → ∞) of the
long-run forecast Et0 [yT] must also be the same under any rule r ∈ R, given the
initial conditions yt0−1. Thus given these initial conditions, the decomposition of the
initial extended state vector into components yt0−1
tr and yt0−1
cyc is the same under






are given as initial conditions, independent of the choice of policy rule.
In the case of the evolution {y˜t} implied by any policy rule r, let us furthermore
consider the decomposition
y˜t = y¯t + y
†
t ,
where {y¯t} is the deterministic sequence
y¯t ≡ Et0−1y˜t
and y†t is the component of y˜t that is unforecastable as of date t0 − 1. Then if we
evaluate
W¯ (y˜; zt0−1) ≡ Et0−1W (y˜;yt0−1, ξt0)
under this evolution, we find that
W¯ (y˜; zt0−1) = W¯ (y¯; zt0−1) + W¯ (y
†; zt0−1). (4.12)
Here all the cross terms in the quadratic form have conditional expectation zero
because y¯ is deterministic while y† is unforecastable.
Moreover, under any rule r, the value of y†t is a linear function of the sequence of
unexpected shocks between periods t0 and t, that is independent of the initial state.
(This independence follows from the linearity of the law of motion (4.6), under the
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linear approximation that we use to solve for the equilibrium dynamics under a given
policy rule.) Hence the second term on the right-hand side of (4.12),54




is independent of the initial state zt0−1 as well. (Let W¯
2
r denote the value of this
expression associated with a given rule r.)
Instead, the value of y¯t will be a linear function of zt0−1, again as a result of
the linearity of (4.6). And in our LQ problem with a self-consistent initial pre-
commitment, the function (4.4) is linear as well. It follows that the first term on the
right-hand side of (4.12) is a quadratic function of zt0−1,
W¯ (y¯; zt0−1) = z
′
t0−1Xrzt0−1,
where the subscript r indicates that the matrix of coefficients Xr can depend on the


















and partition the rows and columns of the matrix Xr conformally, then we observe
that






using the fact that Eµ[z
2] = 0.
Finally, we observe that under any rule r, the linearity of the law of motion (4.6)




t0−1 + (T + 1− t0)γ +BT+1−t0yt0−1cyc,
where the sequence of matrices {Bj} may depend on the rule r, but the first two
terms on the right-hand side (the terms linear in the elements of z1t0−1 as opposed to
the elements of z2t0−1) are the same for all rules. Using this solution for the sequence
y¯ to evaluate W¯ (y¯; zt0−1), we find that the matrix of coefficients Xr,11 in (4.13) is
independent of r, and so can be denoted simply X11. Thus if we integrate (4.12) over






2′Xr,22z2] + W¯ 2r ,
54Here the expected value of the second term on the right-hand side of (4.5) vanishes because of
the unforecastability of y†t0 .
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which is precisely a decomposition of the asserted form (4.11). This proves that the
criterion (4.10) establishes the same ranking of alternative rules, regardless of the
initial condition.
5 Applications
The approach expounded here has already proven fruitful in a number of applications
to problems of optimal monetary and fiscal policy. Benigno and Woodford (2005a)
use this method to derive an LQ approximation to the problem of optimal monetary
stabilization policy in a DSGE model with monopolistic competition, Calvo-style
staggered price-setting, and a variety of exogenous disturbances to preferences, tech-
nology, and fiscal policy. Unlike the method used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Woodford (2002), the present method is applicable even in the case of (possi-
bly substantial) distortions even in the absence of shocks, owing to market power or










t + qy(Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t )2
]
, (5.1)
where pit is the inflation rate between periods t − 1 and t, Yˆt is the log deviation of
aggregate real output from trend, Yˆ ∗t is a target level of output that depends purely on
the exogenous real disturbances, 0 < β < 1 is the representative household’s discount
factor, and the weights qpi, qy are functions of model parameters (both positive if
steady-state distortions are not severe). The single linear constraint corresponds to
the familiar “new Keynesian Phillips curve,”
pit = κ[Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] + βEtpit+1 + ut, (5.2)
where κ > 0 is a function of model parameters and the “cost-push” term ut is a linear
function of the various exogenous real disturbances.
The resulting LQ problem is of a form that has already been extensively studied in
the literature on optimal monetary stabilization policy,55 and so the ways in which the
parameterization of the objective and constraint shape the character of optimal policy
is well understood once the problem is stated in this form. The analysis in Benigno
55See, e.g., , Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003, chap. 7).
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and Woodford (2005a), however, explains the microeconomic determinants of these
factors. For example, it provides an interpretation of the “cost-push” disturbances
that play a crucial role in familiar discussions of the tradeoffs between inflation and
output stabilization, and shows that the cost-push effects of most types of shocks are
larger the more distorted is the economy’s steady state; and it explains the relative
weight that should be assigned to the output-gap stabilization objective, showing that
this need not be positive in the case of a sufficiently distorted economy. (Indeed, if
distortions are severe, the quadratic objective can fail to be concave, so that a small
amount of policy randomization can be welfare-improving.) Benigno and Woodford
(2005b) extend the analysis to the case in which both wages and prices are sticky,
obtaining a generalization of (5.1) in which a third quadratic loss term appears,
proportional to squared deviations of nominal wage inflation from zero. This shows
that the analysis by Erceg et al. (2000) of the tradeoff between stabilization of wage
inflation and price inflation applies also to economies with distorted steady states,
though the policy tradeoffs are complicated by the presence of cost-push terms that
do not appear in those authors’ analysis of the case of an undistorted steady state.
An important limitation of the LQ method of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
that restricts attention to cases in which the utility gradient is zero in the steady state,
is that it cannot easily be applied to analyses of optimal policy for open economies;
for in an open economy, domestic production and consumption cannot be equated,
and the marginal utility associated with a change in either individually will inevitably
be non-zero in any reasonable case. The method proposed here instead allows LQ
analyses of optimal policy also in the case of open economies.
Benigno and Benigno (2006) analyze policy coordination between two national
monetary authorities which each seek to maximize the welfare of their own country’s
representative household, and show that it is possible to locally characterize each
authority’s aims by a quadratic stabilization objective. Previous LQ analyses of
policy coordination have often assumed an objective of the form (5.1) for each national
authority, but with the nation’s own inflation rate and output being the arguments
in each case. Benigno and Benigno instead show that household utility maximization
would correspond to a quadratic objective for each authority with terms penalizing
fluctuations in both domestic and foreign inflation (but with different weights on the
two terms for the distinct national authorities), and similarly with terms penalizing
fluctuations in both domestic and foreign output (again with different weights in
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the case of the two authorities). They also show that each authority’s stabilization
objective should contain a term penalizing departures of the terms of trade from a
“target” level (that depends on exogenous disturbances), and show how both the
weight placed on this additional objective and the nature of variation in the terms
of trade “target” depend on underlying micro-foundations. De Paoli (2004) similarly
shows how the analysis of Benigno and Woodford (2005a) can be extended to a
small open economy, requiring the addition of a terms-of-trade (or real-exchange-
rate) stabilization objective to the two terms shown in (5.1).
Another advantage of the fact that the present method applies to economies with
a distorted steady state is that it can be used to analyze optimal tax smoothing when
only distorting taxes are available as sources of government revenue, after the fashion
of Barro (1979) and Sargent (1987, chap. XV), and allows the theory of tax smooth-
ing to be integrated with the theory of monetary stabilization policy. Benigno and
Woodford (2003) extend the analysis of Benigno and Woodford (2005a) to the case of
an economy with only distorting taxes, and show that the problem of choosing jointly
optimal monetary and fiscal policies can also be treated within an LQ framework that
nests standard analyses of tax smoothing (with flexible prices, so that real effects of
monetary policy are ignored) and of monetary policy (with lump-sum taxes, so that
fiscal effects of monetary policy can be ignored) as special cases. Notably, they find
that allowing for tax distortions introduces no additional stabilization goals into the
quadratic objective (5.1). Instead, the benefits of tax smoothing are represented by
the penalty on squared departures of equilibrium output from its “target” level; tax
variations can increase the average size of this term, because of the effects of the level
of distorting taxes on equilibrium output (which occur due to a “cost-push” effect of
tax rates in the generalized version of the constraint (5.2)). Benigno and De Paoli
(2005) extend this analysis to treat optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a small
open economy, while Ferrero (2005) analyzes optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a
monetary union with separate national fiscal authorities.
All of the analyses just mentioned involve fairly simple DSGE models, in which it
is possible to derive the coefficients of the LQ approximate policy problem by hand.
In the case of larger (and more realistic) models of the kind that are now being esti-
mated for use in practical policy analysis, such calculations are likely to be tedious.
Nonetheless, it is an advantage of our method that it is straightforward to apply it
even to fairly complex models and fairly general specifications of disturbances. Al-
43
tissimo et al. (2005) describe computer code that executes the calculations explained
above, for a general nonlinear problem with an arbitrary number of state variables,
and demonstrate its application to two important extensions of the work described
above, an analysis of optimal monetary policy in the presence of non-trivial frictions
of the kind that result in a transactions demand for money, and an analysis of opti-
mal monetary policy for the empirical model of Smets and Wouters. We believe that
the availability of this code will make it practical to apply these methods to a wide
variety of other models of interest to policy institutions.
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A Appendix: Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Proposition 1




βt−t0 y˜′ty˜t <∞, (A.1)
andH1 ⊂ H is the subspace of sequences ψ ∈ H that satisfy the additional constraints
C(L)ψt = 0 (A.2)
EtD(L)ψt+1 = 0 (A.3)
for each date t ≥ t0, along with the initial commitments
D(L)ψt0 = 0, (A.4)
where we define ψt0−1 ≡ 0 in writing (A.2) for period t = t0 and in writing (A.4).
Proposition 1 For {y˜t} ∈ H to maximize the quadratic form (2.21), subject to the
constraints (2.22) – (2.24) given initial conditions y˜t0−1 and g¯t0, it is necessary and
sufficient that (i) there exist Lagrange multiplier processes56 ϕ˜, λ˜ ∈ H such that the
processes {y˜t, ϕ˜t, λ˜t} satisfy (3.1) for each t ≥ t0; and (ii)






βt−t0 [ψ′tA(L)ψt] ≤ 0 (A.5)
for all processes ψ ∈ H1, where in evaluating (A.5) we define ψt0−1 ≡ 0. A process
{y˜t} with these properties is furthermore uniquely optimal if and only if
V Q(ψ) < 0 (A.6)
for all processes ψ ∈ H1 that are non-zero almost surely.
56Note that ϕ˜t is also assumed to be defined for t = t0 − 1.
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Proof: We have already remarked on the necessity of the first-order conditions
(i). To prove the necessity of the second-order condition (ii) as well, let {y˜t} ∈ H,
and consider the the perturbed process
yˆt = y˜t + ψt (A.7)
for all t ≥ t0−1, where {ψt} belongs to H1 and we define ψt0−1 ≡ 0. This construction
guarantees that if the process {y˜t} satisfies the constraints (2.22) – (2.24), so does
the process {yˆt}.
We note that
V Qt0 (yˆ; ξ) = V
Q















































where we use the first-order conditions (3.1) to establish the first equality, and con-
ditions (3.10) – (3.12) to establish the final equality.
Thus for any feasible process y˜ and any perturbation (A.7) defined by a process
ψ belonging to H1,
V Qt0 (yˆ; ξ) = V
Q
t0 (y˜; ξ) + V
Q(ψ). (A.8)
It follows that if there were to exist any ψ ∈ H1 for which V Q(ψ) > 0, the plan y˜
could not be optimal. But as this is true regardless of what plan y˜ may be, (A.5) is
necessary for optimality. Furthermore, if there were to exist a non-zero ψ for which
V Q(ψ) = 0, it would be possible to construct a perturbation yˆ (not equal to y˜ almost
surely at all dates) that would achieve an equally high level of welfare. Hence the
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stronger version of the second-order conditions (A.6) must hold for all ψ not equal to
zero almost surely, in order for {y˜t} to be a unique optimum.
One easily sees from the same calculation that these conditions are also sufficient
for an optimum. Let {y˜t} be a process consistent with the constraints of the LQ
problem. Then any alternative process {yˆt} that is also consistent with those con-
straints can be written in the form (A.7), where ψ is some element of H1. If the
first-order conditions (3.1) are satisfied by the process {y˜t}, we can again establish
(A.8). Condition (A.5) then implies that no alternative process is preferable to {y˜t},
while (A.6) would imply that {y˜t} is superior to any alternative that is not equal to
y˜ almost surely.
A.2 Lemma 2
Lemma 2 The second-order condition for the previous optimization problem is sat-
isfied — i.e., (A.6) is satisfied by all processes ψ ∈ H1 that are non-zero almost surely
— if and only if (i) every northwest principal minor of the bordered Hermitian matrix
M¯(θ) ≡M(e−iθ, eiθ) (A.9)
of order p > 2(nF + ng) has the same sign as (−1)p−nF−ng for all −pi ≤ θ ≤ pi; and




T ′j[S ′(A0 + A′0)S + β
1/2T ′S ′A1S + β
1/2S ′A′1ST ]T
j (A.10)
is negative definite, i.e., , for each 1 ≤ p ≤ ng, the northwest principal minor of
J of order p has the same sign as (−1)p. Here A0, A1 are the matrices such that
A(L) = A0 + A1L, and
S ≡ [0 I]
is the ny × (ng + ny) matrix that selects the last ny elements of a vector of length
ng + ny, and T is the matrix in (3.7).
Proof: (1) We first show that (A.6) is equivalent to the negative definiteness
of a corresponding quadratic form defined for deterministic sequences. Let H¯ be
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the Hilbert space of complex-valued ny-vector sequences {ψ¯t}, with the respective
complex conjugate {ψ¯†t}, such that
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0(ψ¯†′t )ψ¯t <∞. (A.11)
It will sometimes be convenient to associate with any sequence {ψ¯t} in H¯ a rescaled




for each t ≥ t0. In this alternative representation, H¯ corresponds to the space of





so that it is clear that H¯ is a Hilbert space. Moreover, let H¯1 be the subspace of H¯
consisting of sequences that in addition satisfy
C(L)ψ¯t = 0 (A.13)
D(L)ψ¯t+1 = 0 (A.14)
for all t ≥ t0,57 where in the interpretation of condition (A.13) at date t0 we use the
definition
ψ¯t0−1 ≡ 0. (A.15)
Then we shall establish that (A.6) holds for all (real-valued) stochastic processes
{ψt} ∈ H1 that are not equal to zero at all times almost surely, if and only if










2L−1)]ψˆt < 0 (A.16)
for any complex-valued (deterministic) sequences {ψ¯t} ∈ H¯1 that are not equal to
zero at all times. (Here we have written the definition of V¯ Q in terms of the ψˆ
representation of any sequence ψ¯, in order to make it clear that the quadratic form is
Hermitian, and as a preparation for application of the results of Telser and Graves,
1972. Again we use (A.15) in the definition (A.16).)
57Note that in the definition of the subspace H¯1, we do not require that a condition analogous to
(A.4) be satisfied.
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Note that in the case of a real-valued deterministic sequence {ψ¯t}, (A.16) can






βt−t0ψ¯†′t A(L)ψ¯t < 0. (A.17)
This is then obviously just the second-order condition (A.6) for the special case of a
deterministic sequence. Condition (A.16) is an extension of the quadratic form V¯ Q
to complex-valued sequences, in a way that implies that V¯ Q(ψ¯) is real-valued even
when ψ¯ is complex-valued. The statement of condition (A.16) in terms of a quadratic
form defined for complex-valued sequences allows us to apply the results set out in
Telser and Graves (1972).
(2) We begin by showing that (A.6) holding for all nonzero elements of H1 implies
that (A.16) must hold for all nonzero elements of H¯1. We show this by contradiction.
Suppose instead that that there exists a sequence of vectors {ψ¯t} ∈ H¯1, not equal to
zero at all dates, for which (A.16) does not hold. If a complex-valued vector sequences
of this kind exist, we can also find a real-valued vector sequence. For any ψ¯ ∈ H¯1















real-valued elements of H¯1. Furthermore, one observes that given the symmetry of
the quadratic form defined in (A.16),
V¯ Q(ψ¯) = V¯ Q(ψ¯
re
) + V¯ Q(ψ¯
im
).
Then as by hypothesis V¯ Q(ψ¯) ≤ 0, it follows that V¯ Q ≤ 0 for at least one of the
real-valued sequences as well. Thus we may assume without loss of generality that ψ¯
is a real-valued sequence.
Then we can define a real-valued sunspot process ψt0 = 0, and ψt = σt0+1ψ¯t−1 for
all t ≥ t0 + 1, where σt0+1 is an independently distributed sunspot variable, realized
at date t0 + 1, and taking the value -1 or 1, each with probability 1/2. Then the
process {ψt} satisfies (A.1), is not almost surely equal to zero at all times, satisfies
(A.2)–(A.3) for all t ≥ t0, and satisfies (A.4), but is such that the left-hand side of
(A.6) is greater than or equal to zero. Thus (A.6) would not hold for all processes
ψ ∈ H1. It follows that if (A.6) holds for all nonzero elements of H1, (A.17) must
hold for all nonzero complex-valued sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯1.
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(3) Conversely, one can also show that (A.17) holding for all nonzero elements
of H¯1 implies that (A.6) must hold for all nonzero elements of H1. Let any process









t ≡ Et0ψt and ψ(j)t ≡ Et0+jψt − Et0+j−1ψt, for each j ≥ 1. Note that this
implies that ψ
(j)
t = 0 for all t0 ≤ t < t0 + j, and that the entire sequence {ψ(j)t } is











for any 0 ≤ k ≤ t− t0, from which it follows that if the process {ψt} satisfies (A.1),
the process {ψ(j)t } must also satisfy (A.1), for each j ≥ 0. This in turn implies that
for any j, the sequence of values {ψ(j)t } for t ≥ t0 + j conditional upon reaching a
particular state of the world58 ht0+j at date t0 + j satisfies (A.11) almost surely.
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t+j for all t ≥ t0, where the value of ψ(j)t+j is the
one conditional on that state of the world in period t0 + j. Then the fact that (by
hypothesis) the process ψ satisfies (A.2)–(A.3) for all t ≥ t0 implies that the se-
quence ψ¯
(j)
(ht0+j) satisfies (A.13) and (A.14). Thus for each j ≥ 0, the sequence
ψ¯
(j)
(ht0+j) belongs almost surely to H¯1. Furthermore, there exists at least one j for
which ψ¯
(j)
(ht0+j) is not almost surely equal to zero.








where (as each sequence ψ¯
(j)
is real-valued) V¯ Q is defined as in (A.17). Since by
hypothesis (A.16) holds for all non-zero elements of H¯1, (A.17) also holds for all non-
zero real-valued elements of that space. Thus V¯ Q(ψ¯
(j)
(ht0+j)) ≤ 0 for each j and
58Here we identify a state of the world by the history ht0+j ≡ (ξt0+1, . . . , ξt0+j) associated with
it.
59Here the “almost surely” refers to the ex ante probability distribution over possible states of
the world at date t0 + j.
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each possible state of the world, and the inequality is strict in the case of those j and
those states ht0+j (which must include states that occur with positive probability at
at least one date) for which ψ¯
(j)
(ht0+j) 6= 0. Thus the sum on the right-hand side of
(A.19) must be negative, from which it follows that ψ satisfies (A.6), as was to be
proven.
(4) Our problem thus reduces to a search for necessary and sufficient conditions
under which (A.16) must be satisfied by all nonzero complex-valued sequences ψ¯ ∈
H¯1. We begin by considering the simpler problem of establishing conditions under
which (A.16) holds for all nonzero sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯2, where H¯2 is the subspace of
H¯1 consisting of those sequences that also satisfy (A.14) for t = t0 − 1, again under
the definition (A.15). Since H¯2 is a proper subspace of H¯1, necessary conditions for
this problem are also necessary for the problem of interest to us, though sufficient
conditions are not necessarily sufficient.
The space H¯2 can alternatively be described as the subspace of H¯ consisting of
all sequences that satisfy (A.13) and
D(L)ψ¯t = 0 (A.20)
for all t ≥ t0. These are the purely backward-looking constraints of a standard optimal
control problem, and we can apply the results of Telser and Graves (1972). (Condi-
tion (3.15) implies that the constraints of this backward-looking problem satisfy the
regularity condition assumed by Telser and Graves.)
Using the transformation (A.12), the objective V¯ Q can be alternatively defined as
in (A.16), and the constraints (A.13) and (A.20) written in the form
C(β1/2L)ψˆt = 0,
D(β1/2L)ψˆt = 0
for all t ≥ t0. Then by Theorems 5.1 and 5.3 of Telser and Graves, the second-order
condition for the deterministic optimal control problem with these backward-looking
constraints is satisfied — i.e., (A.16) is satisfied by all non-zero complex-valued
sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯2 — if and only if every northwest principal minor of the bordered
Hermitian matrix
M∗(θ) ≡



















of order p > 2(nF + ng) has the same sign as (−1)p−nF−ng for all −pi ≤ θ ≤ pi.
The matrix M∗(θ) differs from M¯(θ), defined in (A.9), only that in M¯(θ) the
middle block of rows have each been multiplied by β−1/2eiθ, and each of the middle
block of columns have been multiplied by β−1/2e−iθ. The first change multiplies each
principal minor by a factor (β−1/2eiθ)ng , but the second change multiplies each of them
by a factor (β−1/2e−iθ)ng , so that the net effect is a multiplication by β−ng , regardless
of the value of θ. Hence the signs of the principal minors of M∗(θ) are the same as
those of the principal minors of M¯(θ), for all θ, and the condition just stated holds
if and only if condition (i) of the lemma holds. Hence condition (i) is necessary and
sufficient for (A.16) to be satisfied by all nonzero complex-valued sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯2.
(5) It has been shown that condition (i) is a necessary condition for (A.16) to be
satisfied by all nonzero complex-valued sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯1. It remains to be shown
that condition (ii) is also necessary, and that the two conditions are jointly sufficient.
In the remainder of our discussion, we shall suppose that condition (i) holds, and
establish that condition (ii) is then both necessary and sufficient.




V¯ Q(ψ¯) s.t. D(0)ψ¯t0 = µ. (A.21)
In the case that µ = 0, the constraint set for this problem is just the subspace H¯2.
It then follows from section (4) that (given condition (i)) Z(0) = V¯ Q(0) = 0. We
wish to find conditions under which, in addition, Z(µ) < 0 for all µ 6= 0; for this is
equivalent to saying that (A.16) is satisfied by all nonzero ψ¯ ∈ H¯1.
The LQ optimization problem (A.21) is of the same form as the one treated in
part (4), except for the different value for the vector of constants µ. The conditions
for concavity of the problem are the same, and hence are satisfied under condition (i).
It follows that Z(µ) is finite, and that the maximizing sequence ψ¯(µ) is given by the
solution to the first-order conditions. The first-order conditions for this problem are
also independent of the value of µ, and in fact they are again given by (3.4) for each
t ≥ t0, with the following modifications: we now omit the conditional expectation
(since the problem is deterministic); ψˆt replaces yˆt in the definition of the vector zt;
60It is easily shown that the set of sequences ψ¯ ∈ H¯1 consistent with any given initial value µ is
non-empty. If there is no upper bound on the value of V¯ Q on this set, the value of Z(µ) is defined
to be +∞.
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and xt = 0 for all t ≥ t0. Under condition (i), we again have a unique solution to
the first-order conditions satisfying the bound (A.11), for a given initial Lagrange
multiplier ϕˆt0−1. And once again the solution is given by the iterative application of
(3.7), with ψˆt replacing yˆt, setting ξˆt = 0 each period, and starting from the initial
value ψˆt0−1 = 0 and the arbitrary initial value for ϕˆt0−1. Note that the methods used
previously apply equally in the case that the initial vector ϕˆt0−1 is complex-valued,
in which case the solutions for the endogenous variables are also complex-valued; this
will occur if and only if µ is complex-valued in (A.21).









for all t ≥ t0. Here S is the selection matrix defined in the statement of the lemma,
T is the matrix in (3.7), and ϕˆ(µ) is the value of the multiplier ϕˆt0−1 associated with
the constraint indexed by µ in the problem (A.21), which is to say, it is the function
implicitly defined by
d(ϕˆ, 0, 0) = µ,
where d(·) is the same function as in (3.8). Substituting this solution for ψˆ(µ) into
(A.16), we obtain





where J11 is the upper left block of the matrix J defined in (A.10). Since the range
of ϕˆ(µ) is the entire space Cng , and ϕ(µ) = 0 if and only if µ = 0, we observe that
Z(µ) < 0 for all (complex-valued) µ 6= 0 if and only if the real-valued ng × ng matrix
J11 is negative definite, which is condition (ii) of the lemma.
Thus conditions (i) and (ii) are both necessary and sufficient for Z(µ) to be non-
positive for all µ and negative for all µ 6= 0, and hence for (A.16) to be satisfied by
all nonzero ψ¯ ∈ H¯1. This establishes the lemma.







where A is a symmetric 2 × 2 matrix, and that the only constraint on what policy
can achieve is a single, forward-looking constraint
Et[δy˜1t − y˜1,t+1] = 0 (A.23)
for all t ≥ t0, where δ < β−1/2. There are no exogenous disturbances, but the expec-
tations appear because we wish to consider the possibility of (arbitrarily) randomized
policies. We assume an initial pre-commitment of the form
y˜1,t0 = 0, (A.24)
which can be shown to be self-consistent, insofar as the optimal policy (when one
exists) under this constraint involves y˜1t = 0 for all t.
In the case that policy is restricted to be deterministic, the constraint completely
determines the path of {y˜1t}; the only (perfect foresight) sequence consistent with the
initial pre-commitment and the forward-looking constraint is the one in which y˜1t = 0
for all t ≥ t0. The problem then reduces to the choice of a sequence {y˜2t}, constrained
only by the bound (3.2), so as to maximize the objective. This is obviously a concave
problem if and only if y˜′Ay˜ is a concave function of y˜2 when we set y˜1 = 0. This in
turn is true if and only if A22 < 0; the other elements of A are irrelevant.
If instead we allow random policies, the condition just derived is no longer suf-
ficient for concavity (though still necessary). One easily sees that the problem is
concave if and only if A is a negative definite matrix. This is obviously a sufficient
condition (as it implies that (A.22) is concave for arbitrary sequences). To show that
it is also necessary, suppose instead that it is not true. Then there exists a vector
v 6= 0 such that v′Av ≥ 0. The process {y˜t} generated by the law of motion
y˜t = δy˜t−1 + v²t
starting from the initial condition y˜t0 = 0, where {²t} is a (scalar-valued) martingale-
difference sequence, satisfies (3.2) and the constraints (A.23)–(A.24), but implies a
non-negative value for (A.22). Hence the problem is concave if and only if A is a
negative-definite matrix. This requires that A22 < 0, but involves the other elements
of the matrix as well; in particular, it requires in addition that the determinant of A
be positive.
54
Let us examine how these results compare with the conditions stated in Lemma








det M¯(θ) = −β−1(1− 2β1/2δ cos θ + βδ2)A22. (A.25)
Because nF +ng = 1 and n = 3, condition (i) of the lemma involves only the principal
minor of order p = 3, which is the determinant of the entire matrix M¯(θ), and this
is required to be positive for all θ. Since the expression in parentheses in (A.25) is
positive for all θ, the determinant has the sign of −A22, and condition (i) is satisfied if
and only if A22 < 0. As just shown, this is necessary and sufficient for the concavity of
the problem stated above in the case that only deterministic policies are considered,
but it is not sufficient in the case that randomized policies are allowed.
The first-order conditions for the above optimization problem are
A11y˜1t + A12y˜2t − δϕt + β−1ϕt−1 = 0,
A21y˜1t + A22y˜2t = 0
for all t ≥ t0. The unique solution consistent with initial condition y˜t0−1 = 0 (and a
given value for ϕt0−1) and satisfying the bound (A.11) is given by
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y˜1t = −A22|A| (β




−1 − δ2) δt−t0ϕt0−1
for all t ≥ t0. It follows that the upper left element of the matrix defined in (A.10) is
equal to
J11 = (β
−1 − δ2) A22|A| ,
and (given that A22 < 0 as a result of condition (i)) condition (ii) holds if and only
if |A| > 0. This together with the condition that A22 < 0 implies that A is negative
61It is obvious that the first-order conditions have no determinate solution unless |A| 6= 0. We
assume this in writing the solution for y˜t here; the condition is in fact implied by the algebraic
expression for condition (ii) that we derive.
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definite. Thus conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2 are equivalent to the condition that
A be negative definite, which as shown above is indeed a necessary and sufficient
condition for concavity of the problem when one allows for policy randomization.
A.3 Computing ϕ∗ and the Invariant Measure µ
Given that the equilibrium dynamics under optimal policy are given by a law of mo-
tion of the form (3.9), a specification ϕ˜t0−1 = ϕ
∗(yt0−1) of the initial pre-commitment
is self-consistent if the function ϕ∗(·) is such that
[I 0] Z(ϕ∗(yt−1), y˜t−1, ξt, ξt−1) = ϕ
∗(ψ(ξt, [0 I] Z(ϕ
∗(yt−1), y˜t−1, ξt, ξt−1), yt−1))
(A.26)
for all possible (yt−1, ξt), where






and ψ(·) is the function introduced in (2.8) that defines the evolution of the extended
state vector. In this definition, T˜ is the matrix and Ψ(L) the matrix polynomial in
(3.9).
An example of a specification that is self-consistent in this sense would be the
function
ϕ∗(y) ≡ [I 0 0] y, (A.27)
where the identities that define the extended state vector are given by
ψ(ξt, y˜t,yt−1) ≡
 [I 0]Z(ϕ∗(yt−1), y˜t−1, ξt, ξt−1)y˜t
ξt
 . (A.28)
Equation (A.27) identifies the function ϕ∗(·) referred to in equation (4.5) in the text.
We turn to a discussion of the invariant distribution µ over possible initial con-
ditions, that is required in order to compute the proposed welfare criterion (4.10).
Because E¯r(·) is a quadratic function, we only need to compute the unconditional
mean and variance-covariance matrix of yt
cyc. Let the dynamics of the exogenous
disturbances be given by a law of motion of the form
ξt = Θξt−1 + Λ²t,
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where Θ and Λ are matrices of constant coefficients, and {²t} is an i.i.d. vector of
innovations, with mean zero and a variance-covariance matrix given by the identity
matrix. Then under definition (A.28) of the extended state vector, and an initial
pre-commitment implying an initial lagged Lagrange multiplier given by the function
defined in (A.27), the evolution of the extended state vector under optimal policy is
given by the law of motion
yt = Σyt−1 + Ξ ²t (A.29)












(Here we use the notation Ψ(L) ≡ Ψ0 + Ψ1L.) We are interested in the invariant
distribution for the cyclical component yt
cyc of the extended state vector under the
law of motion (A.29).
Under this law of motion, the trend component of the extended state vector is
given by yt





and the cyclical component is correspondingly given by yt
cyc = [I − P ]yt. It then
follows that the law of motion for the cyclical component is
yt
cyc = Σyt−1cyc + [I − P ]Ξ ²t. (A.30)
We note furthermore that (A.30) describes a jointly stationary set of processes, since
the matrix Σ is stable on the subspace of vectors z of the form z = [I −P ]y for some
vector y.63 Hence there exist a well-defined vector of unconditional means and an
unconditional variance-covariance matrix V. The unconditional means are all zero,
while the matrix V is given by the solution to the equation system
V = ΣVΣ′ + [I − P ]ΞΞ′[I − P ′].
This determines the properties of the invariant distribution µ that are required in
order to compute the welfare criterion (4.10).
62Under the assumption (made in the text) that the extended state vector is difference-stationary,
this limit must be well-defined.
63When restricted to this subspace, the operator Σ has eigenvalues consisting of those eigenvalues
of T and Θ that are less than one in modulus.
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